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I: Introduction 
The town of Futaba is nestled between the beautiful ocean and the mountains. It is part of the 
Hamadori region in eastern Fukushima. The people have always been proud of the beauty of 
their land and their own town. Futaba. 
 
There’s no more town. Just land. It’ll turn into a burial ground with a sign that says, once 
there was a town here called Futaba. There was a town called Okuma, and a town called 
Tomioka. And now, in that valley between those mountains, there lies the wreckage of 
Reactor 1, buried right there. And still, there’s puffs of radiation coming out. It was over 
there somewhere, and that’s where the Town Hall used to be. I don’t want to picture it, 
but… I can really see what it’ll be like 20-30 years from now. 
 
This first quote is taken from an old tourist video tape about the town of Futaba. The second is a 
quote from one of Futaba’s evacuees, several months after disaster struck in March of 2011.  
Futaba hosted several of the damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors, after the 
disaster 96% of Futaba was still designated as a no-entry zone due to high radiation levels. In the 
wake of Japan’s 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis, henceforth 
referred to as ‘3.11’, recovery efforts have taken on all shapes and sizes. Some evacuated areas 
have been repaired, some are being reconstructed from scratch, and some have been forsaken 
temporarily (Matanle 2011). In addition to the direct physical dimension of loss and costs, as 
well as the personal psychological trauma many victims suffer, the implicit local social impact 
must also be considered. These communities have been abruptly uprooted. They have lost places 
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and objects that had individual and communal meanings. They have lost a large part of the 
community itself and its inherent sense of belonging and togetherness. They are forced to adjust 
to foreign, often uncomfortable environments. The list goes on.  
At the time of writing almost five years have passed since 3.11, and with the initial shock 
having passed, how are people looking back at it? How have the tragic events that transpired 
settled into history, into national consciousness, into victims’ personal memories? The truth is 
that these processes have only just gotten underway, as 3.11 is in a sense too new to be history 
but too old to be news. Although on the grander national and global scales 3.11 is all but 
forgotten and being digested in the background, for most of the victims this disaster is still 
affecting daily life in a myriad of ways. The question this thesis will focus on is: What exactly 
has been disrupted through this disaster on a social level; how do communities and individuals 
that have been abruptly uprooted by a nuclear disaster cope; how do they reconstruct their 
collective and individual memories and identities; and how do they reframe nuclear energy, 
something that initially brought them prosperity but eventually led to them losing their homes 
indefinitely. 
The 3.11 disaster is undoubtedly one of the most striking events in modern Japanese 
history, and the Fukushima crisis has affected the national consciousness deeply, having 
developed into a situation that can be described as a nationwide moral panic due to fear of 
radiation (Cleveland 2014, 509). There have also been significant effects on the level of citizen 
activism, mobilizing massive protests that will be touched upon later in this thesis. After a brief 
summary of the details of 3.11, Chapter II will discuss the importance of community and explain 
memory on the individual and social levels, in order to set up a theoretical framework, and tying 
it in with established disaster research. In Chapter III the history of ‘nuclear towns’ such as 
5 
 
Futaba will be put into perspective through an exploration of Japan’s complex history with 
nuclear power. All this material will provide a basis that will frame this research’s main 
objective, which is analyzing Japanese film director Atsushi Funahashi’s documentaries Nuclear 
Nation (2012), Radioactive (2013), and Nuclear Nation 2 (2015). This director followed the lives 
of Futaba’s evacuees starting a month after the disaster until over three years later. In his 
approach he mainly observes these evacuees and allows them to tell their stories. The films’ 
focus shifts back and forth from highly personal individual interviews, to the community level, 
recording political debates concerning the treatment and the future of the evacuees. The 
director’s personal input is minimal; his primary aim is to give a voice to these relatively silent 
victims, and present those voices to the world. A world that after all these years has all but 
forgotten about them. Both the interviews and images put forward in these films as well as an 
original interview performed with this director will function as data in an examination of 
Futaba’s community in the years following the disaster. This research will draw upon disaster 
ethnography, memory studies, and a variety of social studies in an attempt to explore diverse 
post-disaster coping strategies on the community and individual levels. In doing so this thesis 
aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion of post-3.11 recovery as well as more wide-ranging 
discussions about disasters and collective memory, and perhaps shed new light on the micro-
level effects of past, current, and future government policy. 
Disaster Background 
On March 11th 2011, at 14:46 Japan Standard Time, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred about 
130km off the coast of Miyagi Prefecture. This is the strongest earthquake ever recorded in Japan, 
and the fourth strongest ever recorded worldwide. This resulted in a magnitude 6-7 shock 
throughout Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, and Tochigi Prefectures, and was observed nationwide 
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from Hokkaido to Kyushu. Hundreds of magnitude 5 or greater related aftershocks followed in 
the months thereafter. The earthquake triggered a tsunami that at its climax reached a height of 
over 9 meters (Japan Meteorological Agency 2012) and washed over Japan’s northeastern 
coastline. Entire towns, ports, industrial, and commercial zones were severely damaged if not 
completely destroyed. 
As of December 10th 2015 the recorded number of casualties stands at 15,893, of which 
9,541 in Miyagi Prefecture, 4,673 in Iwate Prefecture, and 1,612 in Fukushima Prefecture. In 
total 2,565 people are still missing, and 6,152 were reported injured as a result of the earthquake 
and tsunami. The number of buildings completely destroyed amounts to 121,782, among them 
82,999 in Miyagi Prefecture, 19,597 in Iwate Prefecture, and 15,148 in Fukushima Prefecture. 
Many hundreds of thousands more have suffered major to minor damage (National Police 
Agency 2015). The recorded number of people still living in evacuation shelters on December 
10th 2015 is a staggering 190,541. 75,440 of these evacuees are from Fukushima Prefecture, 
73,796 from Miyagi Prefecture, and 30,289 from Iwate Prefecture (Tasukeai Japan 2015). As 
these statistics show, the earthquake and tsunami hit Miyagi the hardest. Nonetheless Fukushima 
has the largest number of evacuees, this is due to the dangers of radiation that has leaked and is 
in fact still leaking from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in the Futaba district. 
The nuclear accident was triggered by the tsunami, as it knocked out the main electric 
supply as well as the backup generators. This power failure shut down the six nuclear reactors’ 
cooling systems, resulting in a meltdown of three of these reactors. Nuclear fuel melted through 
the containment vessels causing a leak, while hydrogen explosions demolished the plant’s 
buildings even further. Nuclear material seeped into the ground, was released into the air, and 
desperate attempts to cool the nuclear material down with seawater have led to irradiated water 
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flowing into the ocean. Now, almost five years later, the plant’s leaks are still not fully under 
control, and it will likely take decades for the plant to be fully decommissioned. An initial 3 
kilometer evacuation zone was quickly expanded to 10 and then 20 kilometers, and residents up 
to 30 kilometers urged to not leave their house. On April 12th the Nuclear Industrial Safety 
Agency raised Fukushima’s nuclear crisis to level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale, 
alongside 1986’s Chernobyl accident. In the wake of this disaster nuclear power plants 
nationwide were temporarily or completely shut down, and the catastrophe inspired shutdowns 
and major changes in nuclear power plants worldwide (Matanle 2011, 824-825).   
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II: Theoretical Framework 
Communities 
Humans are social beings. We know this all too well. People are members of certain groups that 
often have boundaries and rules, whether these are clearly outlined or unspoken. We live in 
societies where normally every individual fulfills some sort of role. Members of a certain society, 
group, or community, are therefore interdependent. One’s experiences are by and large linked to 
the experiences of others (Brown 2000, 35).Furthermore, it is generally accepted that we define 
the bulk of our identities, our selves, through other people (Aronson, Wilson & Akert 2007, 148). 
By contrasting and comparing, by mimicking and resisting, and by a whole host of other social 
processes, our identity and in fact our living reality takes shape. Now, as human beings in 
modern society, we are usually official or unofficial members of countless of different groups on 
many different levels, often overlapping (Tonkin 1995, 106). Awareness of this membership 
varies as well. Relevant to this thesis are some of the most salient ones: family, local community, 
and to a certain extent also the nation. These are examples of social groups which greatly affect 
social identities, and in turn personal identities and self-esteem (Brown 2000, 315).  
Concerning the nation, and its associated nationalism, Ernest Renan and Benedict 
Anderson have authored several core texts, explaining how people come to associate with, and 
care about, larger collectives, of which one will never personally know each individual member. 
One of their main points being that “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in 
truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. 
One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, 
the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in 
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an undivided form” (Renan 1996, 52). This spiritual principle is what holds larger collectives, 
the nation in particular but a variety of it can readily be argued to apply to a range of other 
groups, together and inspires affect. In short, the communities we are a part of influence us on all 
levels, mental and emotional. For this thesis the main focus will be on the local town community. 
Community Attachment 
In the early 20th century it was argued that, through urbanization, ‘true’ small-scale communities 
were disappearing; a community lost perspective. This perspective was later challenged in 
academia and led to the opposite; a community saved perspective. This argued that close social 
bonds and a strong sense of community actually do persist in modern life, by means of smaller 
neighborhoods and communities that are embedded in the larger context of the city. The  
community saved perspective became theorized as community attachment, which relates to “the 
density of established kinships, friendship and acquaintanceship networks”. This concept is 
occasionally confused with social capital, but whereas social capital refers to the network 
structures, community attachment denotes sentiments about place. A place that embodies the 
sentiments of social activity within those network structures. Under normal circumstances 
community attachment frequently affects individual well-being in positive ways, promoting 
mental and physical health (Cope, Slack, Blanchard & Lee 2012, 874). Nevertheless said 
attachment can also have adverse effects, such as when the community is suddenly uprooted, 
leaving the individual in a state of loss. This will be touched upon in a later section discussing 
disaster research. Prior to that, however, an understanding of the role of memory in a social 
context needs to be established. Memory can be regarded as a key mediating term between 
individual and society (Tonkin 1995, 98). As Renan mentioned above, a legacy of memories 
plays a large part in the constitution of a community. Jill Edy described this by saying: “As our 
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society continues to dissect itself into small, competing groups, our possession of a past in 
common may be one of the few ties that bind us as a whole” (1999, 71). What is arguably more 
important than concrete current aspects of community such as place and specific people is the 
larger abstract story that is told. The story that a community tells itself and others. How it 
interprets and reinterprets its past, present, and future. This brings us to the concept of collective 
memory. Collective memory is a contested concept and has interchangeably been referred to as 
social memory, cultural memory, historical memory, historical consciousness, et cetera (Madsen 
& O’Mullan 2013, 60). The following section will provide theoretical background on this 
concept and its usages throughout the past century before applying it to the context of disaster 
specifically.  
Collective Memory  
The conceptualization of collective memory starts with Maurice Halbwachs, a former student of 
Émile Durkheim. He set out from a notion that an individual’s memories are not acquired in a 
vacuum but in the context of a society, and this is also where they recall, recognize, and localize 
their memories (Halbwachs 1992, 38). He noted that there is a collective framework of memory 
in a community or society that entails more than the sum of its parts. A collective’s memory is 
not constructed by mere combination of the memory of its members, but is rather a framework 
that entails an image of the past, reflecting the predominant thoughts of the collective. These 
collective memories nonetheless can only clearly manifest through the voice of individuals who 
place themselves in the perspective of the group, which is in a sense the equivalent of the 
memory of the group realizing itself in individual memories (Ibid. 40; Kansteiner 2002, 180). 
When recalling collective memory “we adopt the attitude common to members of this group and 
pay attention to the memories that are always in the foreground of its way of thought” 
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(Halbwachs 1992, 52). Collective memory operates not primarily through the archiving and 
preserving of the past,  but rather its reconstruction using material and oral traces with the 
addition of recent social and psychological data (Ibid. 119). Language as a social process is vital 
here, Halbwachs summed this up clearly: “There are no recollections to which words cannot be 
made to correspond. We speak of our recollections before calling them to mind. It is language, 
and the whole system of social conventions attached to it, that allows us at every moment to 
reconstruct our past” (Ibid. 173). 
Individual memory, thus, relies heavily on frameworks of collective memory. Because 
memory is continually reconstructed in the process of recollection, many facts and details can get 
distorted and forgotten. There is a reciprocal dynamic between individuals and groups that can 
revise and recover these respective types of memory. The most important aspect here, what 
persists over time, is that communities need unity even if this occurs at the cost of continuity 
(Halbwachs 1992, 182). This is achieved through revision and commemoration, but also through 
an active process of forgetting and so-called mnemonic silence (Stone & Hirst 2014, 314). This 
connects to the discussion of the imagined community of the nation as well: “The essence of a 
nation is that all individuals have many things in common, but also that they have forgotten 
many things” (Renan as cited in Anderson 1991, 6). The preservation or non-preservation, and 
reproduction or non-reproduction of an individual’s memories through a continual relationship 
with them is a vital component of individual identity construction and perpetuation, and parallels 
can be drawn with collective memory and a collective’s identity (Stone & Hirst 2014, 315). This 
makes sense when one considers that collective memory is strongest amongst homogenous 
groups (Kligler-Vilenchik, Tsfati & Meyers 2014, 496), while nevertheless emphasizing the 
agency of individuals.   
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What this tells us more than anything is that memory is not static. Memory on all levels is, 
in fact, a dynamic fluid process. One must be mindful that, valuable as it is to analyze individual 
and collective memories, collective memory does not equal history (Kansteiner 2002, 180; Olick 
1999, 335). According to Tonkin the missing term in Halbwachs’ initial account is socialization, 
which he defines as “the ways and means by which we internalize the external world. Memory 
for [Halbwachs] is like an album of photographs. He does not analyze it as a structuring and 
creative process” (1995, 105). The very act of memorization and recalling on the individual level 
feeds into, and expresses, the collective consciousness and this is central to communities. In 
conclusion, the working definition for collective memory that this thesis will lean towards is 
what Kansteiner refers to as social memory, which are shared memories that “originate from 
shared communication about the meaning of the past that are anchored in the life worlds of 
individuals who partake in the communal life of the respective collective” (2002, 188). In the 
remainder of this thesis, this shared communication might also be referred to as a narrative. 
Disasters  
In anthropology a disaster is defined as “a process/event involving the combination of a 
potentially destructive agent(s) from the natural and/or technological environment and a 
population in a socially and technologically produced condition of vulnerability” (Oliver-Smith 
1996, 303). As opposed to a view wherein they are regarded as wholly unpredictable and 
extreme events, it is acknowledged that every human settlement lives with a certain degree of 
calculated risk. Some areas are more prone to earthquakes, tornadoes, or flooding, and modern 
expert systems have roughly mapped these recurring phenomena. Despite not being able to 
precisely predict disasters occurring, in the big picture they are rarely without precedent. Over 
time most communities have adapted and built resilience against ‘their’ specific recurring 
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disasters, but nonetheless can still be caught off-guard, ill-prepared, and evidently overwhelmed 
by large-scale catastrophes. Unfortunately hazard risk assessment and disaster management are 
complex processes because of the countless social, political, logistical, and economical factors 
that come in to play. These fields are constantly in flux not only through shifting theoretical 
debates but most importantly through learning from the endless stream of case studies that occur 
worldwide.  
A number of things happen when people’s lives and communities are disrupted, or 
uprooted in a disaster. It is not just the actual victim’s community affected but the larger 
collectives it is a part of as well. Notably the nation, and this is where the media comes in. The 
way in which journalists and historians talk and write about the courses of events starts a much 
larger discourse that informs the national, and even global memory, and the place of the victims 
in it. This is why the importance of the stories being told by the direct victims should not be 
understated, as they inspire deeper reflection and renegotiation of much larger narratives: “The 
stories of the past create the social memory of the present that influences how communities 
respond in the future”, and the re-telling of these stories has the potential to become as influential 
as living the experiences themselves (Madsen & O’Mullan 2013, 68-69). In turn, such larger 
narratives can affect the smaller-scale ones as well, there is a fluid dynamic of constant 
renegotiation following a disaster, which slows down as time passes but never completely. 
Though not a conceptual focus of this thesis, certain narratives associated with a group’s 
identity can contribute to the resilience of a community (Madsen & O’Mullan 2013, 62-63). 
There are different strategies that can be applied post-disaster, whether maintaining the existing 
collective narrative, shifting it into a recovery-focused narrative, or moving away from it 
(Sakamoto, Kimura, Matsuda & Matsuoka (2009). The collective narrative determines how the 
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community describes itself, their circumstances and prospects and thus influences how it 
responds to a disaster, and how it recovers (Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2011). Memory is triggered 
by material evidences with personally evocative significance as well as people and actions 
(Tonkin 1995, 108). This is why losing a dear personal possession, not to mention one’s house, 
can be a traumatic experience that no financial reimbursement can truly compensate. Certain 
collective narratives can definitely be fruitful when speaking of rebuilding homes post-disaster. 
Though they do not provide the resources, a positive self-reliant attitude that at least sees 
rebuilding as possible, perhaps based on past experience of the community, can lead 
communities to start rebuilding quicker and more effectively (Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2011, 
277-278; Yamamura 2010, 1019).  
Disaster situations have oftentimes been referred to as a natural laboratory (Oliver-Smith 
1996, 304). Most large-scale natural disasters can cause a number of people to be either 
voluntarily or forcibly displaced. It has been established above that place and spatiality play a 
vital role in the construction of individual and community identities. Hence, abrupt community 
displacement can have major traumatic consequences in a number of ways (Ibid., 308). 
Depending on the scale of a disaster, social ties can actually be increased, which mitigates the 
adverse consequences. People banding together and supporting each other: the smallest of 
supportive gestures are appreciated more than ever. However when a disaster is highly 
destructive and disruptive these protective features of social connectedness are unlikely to be 
enough to compensate for the severe negative impact. On the individual level not only the 
psychological trauma the destruction itself (Usami et al. 2014), but the mere effect of relocation 
itself increases depression risk (Najarian 2001) even up to the point of suicide (Matsubayashi, 
Sawada & Ueda 2013).  
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This brings us back to the discussion of community attachment, which is almost as much 
about the place as it is about the people. To many, and one might argue the relatively elderly 
rural community especially, the concept of ‘home’ is essential to them. The core of a displaced 
community will always want to return home, despite being aware of the natural risks that go 
hand in hand with the place. In a 2012 paper Ueda & Torigoe examined a small town coastal 
community that was also struck by 3.11’s tsunami. They asked the question: why do victims of a 
tsunami return to the coast? Their answer was that people who live in these environments 
perceive the existence of a certain balance. Many people in these communities are involved in 
fishing or other ocean-related industries. Their income depends on the ‘blessings’ the ocean 
gives them. These people know that they cannot have the fertility of the sea without its severity. 
These are “two sides of the same coin” (Ueda & Torigoe 2012, 28). Their coastal existence is 
vital to their personal and communal identity. Unfortunately as this thesis will show, returning 
home is not always that simple. Sometimes rebuilding the old is rendered impossible, as is the 
case for the residents of Futaba for the foreseeable future. The following chapter will provide 
background into the history of nuclear power in Japan. The nuclear power that defined Futaba as 
more than just another coastal town. But also the nuclear power that now prevents them from 
returning home. 
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III: Japan’s Nuclear History 
There are two of them around town. Near the entrance of the Town Hall and 
by the community center. Those banners boasting the town’s partnership with  
nuclear power. It was supposed to be this prosperous co-existence.  
 
Postwar Nuclear Allergy 
Japan’s relationship with nuclear power is a unique one. As we all know, Japan is the only 
country to have fallen victim to the destructive power of nuclear weapons. The horrific 
destruction that took place in Hiroshima and Nagasaki shocked the world and abruptly put an 
end to World War 2. How did both the Japanese government and its citizens come to seemingly 
embrace nuclear energy in the wake of these terrible events, only about two decades later? The 
truth is that directly after the war, a major part of the Japanese public was actually unaware of 
the horrific realities of what had happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki due to censorship by the 
American occupational forces. After the end of the occupation in 1952 public awareness slowly 
grew through some forms of popular media, but it wasn’t until the Daigo Fukuryu Maru incident 
in 1954 that public outrage started flaring up. In March that year the US performed a hydrogen 
bomb test which led to a crew of Japanese fishermen to suffer from severe radiation exposure. In 
Japan’s major newspaper ‘Asahi Shinbun’, this incident was framed as Japan “being a victim for 
the third time”. Following this incident, a petition movement for the ban on nuclear trials spread 
throughout the country. The number of signatures reached a third of Japan’s population at the 
time by the summer of 1955. So there was a huge spike in public attention thanks to this petition 
(Yamazaki 2009). Also, inspired by the Daigo Fukuryu Maru incident, the film ‘Gojira’ or 
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‘Godzilla’ was released in 1954. The Japanese public was fearful of uncontrolled and 
unpredictable nuclear technology, and this fear was symbolized in Gojira: a giant monster 
mutated by nuclear radiation who goes on a rampage through Japan. As its producer Tomoyuki 
Tanaka famously stated: “The theme of the film, from the beginning, was the terror of the bomb. 
Mankind had created the bomb, and now nature was going to take revenge on mankind”.  
 Meanwhile, after Eisenhower’s 1953 United Nations speech on ‘Atoms for Peace’, 
changes to Japan’s national budget allotted 300 million yen for the promotion of science and 
technology, over 85% of which went into nuclear energy research. The Japanese government, 
however, had no choice but to take note of the public resistance and in December 1955 the 
Atomic Energy Basic Law was implemented, ensuring nuclear energy would only be used for 
peaceful purposes. Nonetheless, people were still fearful of nuclear technology as a whole and 
there was of course major resistance from Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors (Yamamoto 2012), 
so how could the Japanese public accept this law? It was achieved through a pattern of denial, 
cover-up, and cozy bureaucratic collusion between industry and government. Pro-nuclear power 
forces at the time by managing to make the public believe that there was a major dichotomy 
between the physics of nuclear power and that of nuclear weapons. Those who opposed were 
regularly ridiculed for their so-called ‘nuclear allergy’, suggesting that there must be something 
seriously wrong with them, how else could they be so ignorant to the benefits of technology.  
At this point the pro-nuclear movement was actually not unified, but instead consisted of 
a mix of politicians, businessmen, scientists and representatives of the media. Influence from the 
US should also be considered as, at the advent of the Cold War, Japan’s identity was transformed 
into a junior member of the US-led alliance against the communist threat. Japan served as a host 
for some of the US’s atomic arsenal in secret, as well as a democratic and capitalist example to 
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the rest of Asia. They had a large stake in Japan’s industrial and technological development. In 
1955 the pro-nuclear forces in Japan became more centralized and established through the 
Atomic Energy Commission, the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, and the Japan Atomic 
Industry Forum (Dusinberre & Aldrich 2011, 688). Eventually, in conjunction with the general 
movements towards Japan’s astonishing industrial boom that was to follow in later decades, the 
nuclear industry was commercialized. This resonated with a Japanese population that was 
beginning to enjoy the benefits of postwar recovery (Kelly 2015, 55-57). Prime Minister Eisaku 
Satō approved the commission of the first nuclear power plant in 1966. 
Localized Pro-Nuclear Strategies 
On the local governmental scale the financial benefits were alluring. Promises of subsidies for 
the improvement of infrastructure, for instance, were clearly appealing incentives for 
impoverished rural areas (Aldrich 2014, 194-196), as were other official and unofficial economic 
boosts associated with hosting a nuclear power plant. In 1974 the Three Power Source 
Development Laws were established which allowed among other things for taxes paid by 
electricity users to be funneled back into the host communities over a five-year period 
(Dusinberre & Aldrich 2011, 692). Japanese local governments have always been fairly, if not 
completely, dependent on central government funding (Aldrich 1999, 71-72). It makes sense to 
think that local nuclear host officials perhaps thought that in the long run this would make them 
more financially independent, with their infrastructure boosted and the labor market expanding. 
An unforeseen consequence, however, was that these host communities would eventually turn 
out to become dependent on the nuclear industry themselves, requiring constant expansion 
(Hasegawa 2014, 289), this will be explained in the next chapter through the example of Futaba. 
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By way of strategies implemented by all the pro-nuclear parties, the mass media 
especially, campaigns to convince the public penetrated the daily lives of all civilians. Opinion 
polls started showing that a significant portion of anti-nuclear citizens were young women and 
mothers. As a result a lot of advertisements were aimed directly at this target group, showing 
young mothers with their children smiling, and reassuring them of the safety of nuclear energy 
(Aldrich 2014, 193). Nevertheless national organized resistance grew, and by the 1960s the 
approach of convincing the public became more focused on the specific locales where resistance 
would be the weakest, being impoverished rural areas. An example of such targeted approaches 
were subsidized scientific studies conducted to prove that nuclear power plants proved no 
significant risk to fishing industries. Furthermore there was a variety of campaigns implemented 
to familiarize potential host communities with nuclear power. The local officials and other town 
folk were taken on free ‘study trips’ to already existing nuclear facilities, which supposedly 
involved as much alcohol-induced fraternizing between these potential hosts and the nuclear 
power company representatives, as actual studying. Within these small town communities “the 
structure of civil society meant that an ordinary citizen’s pro-nuclear decision was as likely to be 
based on social, political, and even historical obligations as it was on a clear grasp of atomic 
energy issues” and these strategies proved to be highly effective (Dusinberre & Aldrich 2011, 
700). The eventual cure for so-called ‘nuclear allergy’ was found in the right combination of “the 
management of local civil society, the fear of hometown decline, the intervention of a power 
company in daily life, the attraction of central government subsidies, and not least the bypassing 
of a debate about safety (Ibid. 703). Opinion polls in the mid-1970s showed that almost 70 
percent of respondents were in support of Japan’s nuclear energy policy (Ibid. 693). 
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Post-disaster Nuclear Discourse 
On March 11
th
 2011 there were 54 nuclear reactors in Japan. Altogether these reactors were 
responsible for generating almost a third of Japan’s total electricity supply (Kingston 2014, 249). 
After 3.11 a confusing period of shifting blame and pointing fingers from government officials to 
representatives of the plant’s owner: the Tokyo Electric Power Company (henceforth: TEPCO) 
followed, with nobody willing to take full responsibility for this enormous disaster. But in late 
2012 TEPCO confessed that they failed to adopt proper safety measures, and could have 
prevented the nuclear crisis if they had done so. They had downplayed tsunami risk and resisted 
international safety standards. Also not all employees were properly trained for emergency 
situations. Reasons for this being that TEPCO “feared that any measures to improve safety at the 
Fukushima plant would stoke the anti-nuclear movement, interfere with operations, raise costs, 
and create legal and political problems” (Kingston 2014, 247). 
After 3.11 public outcry concerning the abolishment of nuclear energy flared up. Mass-
protests in Japanese had been practically unheard of since the politically turbulent 1960s, but in 
the months following the disaster there were several demonstrations held in Tokyo counting 
around 15,000-20,000 participants. On September 19
th
 a planned 50,000 strong rally for the 
abolition of nuclear power was attended by 65,000 (Hasegawa 2014, 292). Smaller 
demonstrations have persisted, but eventually to no real avail. The long-term effects on Japan’s 
energy policies are surprisingly minor. Although in the wake of 3.11 many advanced industrial 
nations such as Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium have started to move away from 
nuclear power despite the significant economic costs, Japan actually might not. Prime Minister at 
the time of the disaster and the first half year of its aftermath, Naoto Kan, expressed a desire to 
end Japan’s dependence on nuclear power. He ordered stress-tests of Japan’s nuclear reactors 
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which prompted a temporary shutdown of all of them. Nonetheless in June 2012 Prime Minister 
Yoshihiko Noda approved the restart of two reactors (Aldrich 2014, 202-203). Although as of 
November 2015 there is only one fully operational active power plant in Japan, many others are 
being prepared for restart. Current Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is a resolute advocate of nuclear 
energy as well, and the general policy as it stands is aimed towards significantly improving the 
safety of nuclear reactors, and thus phasing it out completely at some point does not appear 
likely any time soon (Kingston 2014, 247). 
As far as controlling the public opinion is concerned, there have been many claims that 
negative coverage of the nuclear industry after 3.11 was curbed by certain major media 
companies. National news broadcasts downplayed the severity of the nuclear accident for some 
time, while the government itself was being vague as well. Within Japan political, business, 
bureaucratic, and scientific circles are infamously closely intertwined. In the meanwhile 
international media actually was reporting more accurately on the nuclear meltdown, hence a 
great deal of confusion emerged. (Ibid. 250; Cleveland 2014; Endo 2012). By now this confusion 
is clearing up, but there has been a great deal of successful lobbying from pro-nuclear forces and 
the general public is slowly accepting that from an economic perspective nuclear energy is a 
necessity, at least for now. As a result of the history described in this chapter, Japan has become 
a nuclear nation, and is dependent on it. Changing this would therefore require a massive change 
in government. As Daniel Aldrich notes: “Japanese leaders and civil servants envision public 
opinion as malleable; in this approach, the people’s perspective should be changed to match the 
perspective of the administration rather than elevated as a guidestar which should be followed” 
(Aldrich as cited in Kingston 2014, 263). The public remains skeptical as polls show (Ibid. 265) 
but with civil society apparently diminishing again slowly and the majority of the public in a 
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sense bowing their heads to the government’s policies, change is far off, despite this world-
shocking disaster (Arase 2012). 
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IV: Analysis  
Atsushi Funahashi is a director who creates both fiction and documentary film. He was in New 
York when 9.11 happened and this spurred him to make his first documentary. He returned to 
Japan, filmed two more fiction films and was planning to shoot his next one in the coastal town 
of Hitachi. During pre-production this town was hit by the 3.11 tsunami and production had to be 
halted. Observing the media coverage on the disaster and the way the government was handling 
it, he became frustrated. He heard about the citizens of Futaba, housing several of the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear reactors, which were evacuated to an empty high school all the way in Saitama, 
250km away. He visited them in the beginning of April 2011. Talking to these people he soon 
found out, to his embarrassment, that all of the power generated in these nuclear power plants 
was sent to the Tokyo metropolitan area. This struck him to his core on a personal level. He 
decided to keep filming the conversations between him, who was using this electricity, and the 
people of Futaba, who had been providing this electricity and now lost their homes as a result. 
The hundreds of hours of footage he shot eventually resulted in the first 2012 film, Nuclear 
Nation (original title: ‘futaba kara tooku hanarete’ meaning ‘Far removed from Futaba’), its 
2014 sequel, Nuclear Nation II (‘futaba kara tooku hanarete dainibu’), as well as a 2013 short 
film titled Radioactive. These films provide a unique perspective. Funahashi was allowed to 
spend time among the community of Futaba evacuees when most other press was not. He formed 
bonds with his subjects and won their trust. He approached the production of these 
documentaries in a very open, semi-structured, manner. His intention was to observe these 
people and film them telling their stories in natural, intimate, conversation. The following section 
will briefly introduce and summarize the films separately, and lead into an analysis of their story 
and content as a whole. 
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Nuclear Nation (2012), or NN1 
Nuclear Nation observes the Futaba evacuees between spring and autumn 2011, as indicated by 
occasional on-screen text. The amount of people living in the high school shelter in Saitama 
starts out at 1436, and drops down to 1001 in June, 880 in August, and 673 in November. The 
first scenes of the film consist largely of the people going about their lives there, one man 
speaking about losing his house and people that perished in the tsunami. Then, the town’s mayor 
Katsutaka Idogawa is introduced. Idogawa is the most central character throughout this film, and 
will be discussed in-depth below. As the film progresses the viewer is introduced to several other 
evacuees, some which open up very broadly about the disaster and their experience, and others 
commenting only briefly on how they are being treated by the government and how they feel 
about nuclear power in the wake of this disaster. The living conditions in the shelter are cramped 
and undesirable, and the government’s and TEPCO’s apologies do not appear to be perceived as 
sincere at all. Months after the disaster families are allowed a temporary return to the exclusion 
zone for the sake of attempting to recover items or paying their respects to the deceased. This 
provides us with some of the most emotional and evocative shots of the film as a the camera is a 
first-hand observer to these people returning to directly face the devastation of their house, their 
town, their home. Throughout the film the director switches between showing the life at the 
shelter, intimate encounters with evacuees, and the mayor Idogawa as he struggles to come to 
terms with what happened, and moreover struggles at several official meetings to lobby for the 
interests of his town’s inhabitants. The film ends on a depressing note, showcasing the destroyed 
Fukushima landscape, and the final words: “Residents have yet to be compensated by the 
government or TEPCO for the loss of their homeland. They continue to live their lives in limbo”. 
Nuclear Nation 2 (2014), or NN2 
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The second film continues roughly where the first left off; in the winter of 2011/2012. The 
subsequent pace is a lot higher starting out with 627 evacuees left in the high school, moving 
through the seasons of 2012 in quick succession, and 133 people left in March 2013, reaching 
zero in March 2014. There seems to be more focus on the political aspect than in the first film, as 
mayor Idogawa is forced to resign in January 2013 and replaced by Shiro Izawa. Two months 
later the official location of the Town Hall is moved to Iwaki, a town geographically on the 
Eastern coast and significantly closer to Futaba. Around 1444 Futaba evacuees are living in 
temporary or permanent housing in Iwaki at this time. The director switches between the Saitama 
location and this location a lot, observing how people are getting on in life. Many are still 
struggling and the temporary housing in Iwaki is only a slight improvement from the shelter in 
Saitama. Here in Iwaki is where they establish a so-called “Temporary Town”. On December 
27
th
 2013 the last five people leave the shelter in Saitama. There is also another visit to the 
exclusion zone, and some more personal stories, but the two mayors’ stories garner the most 
attention, and tell a story reflecting the larger discourse concerning nuclear power nationwide. 
The discourse of the nuclear nation. 
Radioactive, or RA (2013) 
Using footage recorded during his time with Futaba’s evacuees, Funahashi also put together this 
short film running under 40 minutes long. Here the interview material, activities, and meetings 
focused on are all related to the dangers and fear of radiation.  
Futaba 
As described in the previous chapter, towns that are hosts to nuclear power plants have enjoyed 
great benefits, at least initially. Now we take a closer look at Futaba based on information 
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provided in the films. Before the nuclear power plant called Fukushima Daiichi was built, Futaba 
was a small and impoverished village. It was a desolate place, so its land was used for a variety 
of agricultural purposes throughout its history. At some point it was an airfield, later it was used 
for salt-production, and then halfway through the 20
th
 century TEPCO started surveying the land 
and purchased the property in 1960. In 1966 the Prime Minister approved the construction of the 
first reactor, which began the following year. Mayor at this time was Seitaro Tanaka, claiming 
(NN2, 0:53:57) “We need the nuclear plant to keep this town afloat”. At this time most people 
were excited that a huge corporation was in town, and in line with how nuclear energy had been 
promoted as discussed above, the most of the town ended up not perceiving it as a major risk and 
went along with the mayor’s proposition. There was a huge initial economic boost associated 
with the first four reactors built in the Futaba area, and in 1979 reactors 5 and 6 were put into 
operation. Mirroring the general Japanese economic flourishing at this point in time, partially 
thanks to nuclear power, the town became rich and shopping streets became lively.  
A sample of testimonies from some of the elderly evacuees, present in Futaba throughout 
these decades (NN2, 0:55:00): “People didn’t have to leave town anymore to find work.”, 
“People thought the plant was good because it meant money. Farmers would go there to do some 
weeding whenever they had spare time. They got extra cash from the plant.”, “I used to run a 
coffee shop. And there would be these lineups to get in. We were making money hand over fist 
[…] My income doubled every year.”, “It provided the town with money, even if we trash-talk it 
now. So for those 40 years, it was a godsend”. They speak proudly of those days, and this pride 
even has its physical manifestations in two large banners on the main roads into Futaba boasting 
how nuclear power is good for the community, society, and the nation. This is reflected in how 
Futaba’s elderly evacuees speak of the ‘good old days’, their positive memories are an essential 
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core aspect to the town’s identity. Or at least they were. But now their attitudes towards nuclear 
technology has been flipped upside down. The collective memory of the town, the town’s 
identity, and people’s individual memories and identity beg modification in the wake of 3.11. 
The most well-documented case of this process is found in the town’s mayor, as he was an active 
proponent of nuclear energy before the disaster, and faced a personal struggle afterwards. 
Mayor Idogawa: Representing the Collective 
Katsutaka Idogawa, mayor before and after the disaster confirms the testimonies given by the 
elderly residents. He also explains how the town used to be self-sufficient, claiming that ‘nuclear 
money’ was roughly half of the town’s income for some time. However he also sheds more light 
on what happened after the initial financial boom. The major benefits were actually short-lived. 
The property value surrounding the nuclear power plant started dropping quickly. The five-year 
period tax re-funneling mentioned in the previous chapter ended. As a result construction 
projects initiated enthusiastically during the boom were halted, and from the late 80s onwards the 
town spiraled towards bankruptcy. By 2007 Futaba was one of the 10 poorest towns in all of 
Japan. This led to new plans for building more reactors, to secure more income for Futaba. These 
plans halted for a while in the 2000s when it was uncovered that TEPCO had been falsifying 
maintenance reports. Nevertheless, Idogawa pushed for those plans again, secured the funds, and 
ironically enough the construction was scheduled to begin in April 2011. Idogawa was clearly a 
strong advocate of nuclear plants before the disaster, they brought his town and its people wealth. 
So how has the disaster impacted his attitude and memories?  
Right after the disaster, in the beginning of the first film, Idogawa’s main concern is 
providing as much care, resources, and information for the evacuees as he can. During some 
private conversations he contemplates the past as described above, and the regretful tone in his 
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voice is tangible. Later in 2011 he seems determined to resist the government’s plans to buy up 
the land, an effort for decontamination should at least be made instead. He is willing to fight for 
the town, to reclaim it as soon as possible, stating (NN1, 1:05:05): “I won’t let Futaba get wiped 
off the face of the Earth. People who’ve had their homes taken from them, how these people are 
feeling, living in the shadows, has become painfully obvious to me […] It’s that refugee feeling 
that I never want to pass on to future generations”. In late summer 2011 a yearly meeting of 
municipalities from across Japan that host nuclear plants is held to lobby the government on the 
issues affecting them. Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Banri Kaieda as well as 
Minister of Environment Goshi Hosono are present, except both leave right after making the 
opening statements, due to other obligations. The camera picks up Idogawa with a downturned, 
contemplative expression. Only after the Ministers leave is the floor opened for comments from 
all the municipalities’ mayors. Idogawa’s brief but powerful speech is as follows (NN1, 
1:08:30):  
I’m representing Futaba. I want to know why we’re being made to feel this way. It’s 
frustrating. It’s honestly humiliating. What were we believing in all this time? Why did 
we bother trying to improve our town? We used the subsidy money to carefully maintain 
our town’s infrastructure. And we’ve left it all behind. Was the money put to good use? 
What were we thinking when we accepted a nuclear power plant into our community? I 
think about it day and night. What does the nuclear power committee think? When you 
came and explained it to us, you lied, by saying that it was safe and secure. But we, who 
trusted and believed you, can no longer live in our own town. All we really want is to live 
the way we did before all this happened. Please let us do that. We’re tired of all the 
waffling. We’re sick of it. I’ve been exposed to radiation. We’ve been asking the 
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government to test us for radiation exposure. But nothing’s been done, “You are the 
priority.”, “We’ll do it. We’ll do it right away.”, “We’ll do something so please just 
wait.”, we believed those words and waited patiently. Who’s responsible for this? You 
people need to smarten up. 
Contrasting his attitude towards nuclear power now, to how he explained the benefits and his 
advocacy in the past, it is a powerful, though not completely unsurprising shift. He is nearing the 
end of a process of transforming his attitude, his memory, and his identity, in order to come to 
terms with the recent harsh reality. Moreover he has become vigilant and by confronting the 
crowd gathered at this meeting is challenging them to reflect deeply as well. At the end of the 
first film he summarizes to the camera (NN1, 1:24:30):  
The power plant only did us 40 years of good. And in those 40 years Futaba went in the 
wrong direction. And accumulated a lot of debt. I’ve been thinking about the pros and 
cons of nuclear plants. I don’t know what kind of reparations TEPCO has in mind. But 
we have to take back what we’ve lost. Just covering damages isn’t enough. We won’t be 
benefitting in any way. Our town’s image is down the toilet. And then there’s 
discrimination too. Children and their young parents are saying they won’t live there 
anymore. That means families are uprooting. Now I realize that the cons far outweigh the 
pros. I’ve come to think that it was wrong to invite the nuclear plant into our lives. I have 
a feeling that ever since the plant was built we in Futaba were swimming in radiation as a 
community. But the people in Tokyo who weren’t being soaked with radiation? They 
prospered. 
He provides the key narrative of the past, as framed from the present. Being in a sense the 
foremost representative of the town, one might regard this person as an embodiment of the 
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collective mind, or at least its majority. The complete u-turn is evident, and town and its 
community will clearly never return to the way it was. 
Sadly, more than a year later, as progress has been limited, mayor Idogawa is forced to resign 
due to a vote of no-confidence by other members of the Town Council. As he leaves there is an 
emotional goodbye with dozens of townspeople giving him flowers and applause. He reassures 
them that he will still do what he can to support them and their children.  
Decontamination Waste Storage: Taint vs Absolute Loss 
One of the main issues relating to Idogawa´s resignation was the storage of contaminated waste 
resulting for decontamination efforts. He wanted a different solution than what the government 
was posing, which was having a designated zone in Futaba where this soil would be stored and 
piled up. As a community representative explains in a meeting attended by Prime Minister Naoto 
Kan, in the short film (RA, 0:29:40): “The decontamination work is pointless. Do you know 
where all that contaminated soil goes? They pile it up and put a tarp over it, but it’s half-open, a 
meter above the ground. […] You’ll never be able to eliminate all the radiation. Not unless you 
cut down all the trees in the mountains first. You can’t imagine our pain”. The government’s 
plan for the interim storage site does include the condition that the waste will be disposed outside 
Fukushima after 30 years. Nonetheless it is clearly far from ideal. Even if the storage site was not 
there, Futaba would retain an image of being ‘tainted’ for decades to come. Add in a zone with 
thousands upon thousands of large black bags, even if contained inside sturdy walls, it changes 
the face of the town completely even if the rest were to be rebuilt to a pre-disaster state. As 
strong as the community attachment and the desire to return home might be, this plan throws a 
major shadow over even the most optimistic of recovery visions. 
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The Futaba community appealed this plan, and when a congressman attempts to give 
them the government’s perspective he more or less gets booed away by the residents. There is a 
major dilemma here. Given the current scenario, what would be better? Wait until enough time 
passes, which will mean many decades in most of the town, until the radiation drops down to an 
acceptable level? Support the government’s current decontamination effort? Which really just 
means concentrating it to a specific area within the town as much as possible. Or give up on ever 
returning to Futaba at all? None of these are ideal or even satisfying in the slightest to most of 
Futaba’s evacuees, and making a choice is extra difficult considering how the official 
information and estimations keep changing. In an information meeting in the spring of 2014 
concerning the interim storage site former mayor Idogawa voices his frustration one final time 
(NN2, 1:45:20):  
I am extremely upset about this. You have no right to tell us to do such-and-such after 
taking away our town. We are all living within the law, but you people are a different 
story. What are you even doing here? We’re all dead-set against this. How did we even 
get to this point? It’s absurd. We’re here because of TEPCO’s negligence. Why aren’t 
they represented here today? And I want to remind you that the Town of Futaba never 
agreed to this. And we’ve been voicing our opposition since the beginning. But here we 
are at this outrageous information session. I’m extremely angry about this. Even while I 
was still mayor, I’ve never had a sincere word from any of you at the Environment 
Ministry. How is this info session even happening? You call this a democracy?  
Another speaker from neighboring town Okuma adds the bold statement (NN2, 1:46:33): “It’s 
wrong to make us bear the brunt of this disaster. Final disposal should be in Tokyo, since they 
used the power we produced”. Another noted: “So you’ll compensate up to here, but if we’re 
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over there, we need to go back? Are you crazy?”, and “Do you have any idea how many times 
our community has been divided? Divided by compensation rules, by radiation zoning… and 
here we go again. Now you say you’ll pay us off with subsidies to compensate for our homes, 
but wait a minute. That money depends on the fact that the town exists and that we all live there. 
What the hell happens to us if the town disappears?”. In response, all the Ministry’s 
representatives seem to be able to muster is “We currently don’t have an alternative plan 
available”.  
With no alternative plan available, the current plan appears to move forward, and the 
community seems powerless to oppose. By the end of the second film the director and the new 
mayor, Shiro Izawa, visit one of the trial sites for the decontamination effort, showcasing a vast 
sea of black bags filled with irradiated soil. Even now, radiation levels are still over 60 times 
higher than before the accident, and it only gets worse the closer to the plant one gets. Mayor 
Izawa and his assistant take a walk through Futaba’s main shopping street, the picture of a ghost 
town, and nostalgically points out certain shops and restaurants and his memories associated with 
them. One restaurant in particular he remembers as being a place where you can sit down and 
talk with anyone, an important location in the community. Most of the owners of these shops 
survived and have moved on to different locations throughout Fukushima. He laments (NN2, 
1:37:00): “All our lives changed because of the earthquake and the nuclear accident. Our 
community’s been torn apart”. He longs for the past, as does almost all of Futaba. Just like the 
previous mayor he clearly has the people’s best interest in mind, but virtually powerless as he is, 
he seems to reluctantly accept the government’s storage plan. They will have to find a place for it 
in the narrative of Futaba, because giving up on returning for ever is not an option, the 
community attachment is too strong, at least for the core community. If and when they can start 
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returning to the town, which might be decades away, Futaba’s identity will have to be reinvented. 
One perhaps incorporating victimhood, but also with potential mnemonic silence concerning 
issues such as the storage site. 
The Elderly: Futility 
The following sections shall focus on the evacuees in their varying post-disaster experiences. 
How do they attempt to come to terms with the disaster and their current unstable living 
situations as refugees? In the first half of the first film they are mostly seen, and talking about, 
their current situation. The living standards at the shelter in the high school are low. The people 
are crowded and uncomfortable and the food is bland, as attested to by both the camera and 
several brief testimonies. This is only a month after the disaster, clearly the evacuees are still 
processing the enormous initial shock, and focus on their basic survival at the moment. 
Throughout the next few months their lives appear quite dull. Though there are some communal 
activities being organized occasionally, such as morning group exercise, most of their time 
appears to be spent doing nothing. A ninety year old lady points out that she does not want to die 
here in this shelter. This is followed up by more images of seniors sleeping. Japan’s aging 
society tends to be overrepresented in rural areas, and the Futaba community is no different. 
After the disaster some of them are left without families, such as one elderly lady who celebrated 
New Year’s (a typically family-oriented holiday in Japan) with a handful of others in the same 
situation, reminds us that (NN2, 0:11:40): “People with family are fortunate. Despite everything”. 
In spring 2013 it is announced the high school shelter in Saitama will be closing down. At this 
time there are 123 residents left. Reaction of an old man (NN2, 0:52:00): “What’s closing down? 
This place. When? … But I have nowhere to go”. For these elderly residents more than anyone 
the sense of futility of holding on to potentially returning becomes more and more apparent. In 
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one of the debates in the second film surrounding the storage of decontamination waste a Futaba 
man now living in Iwaki exclaims (NN2, 0:48:20): “We’re all gonna die here. In 30 years, most 
of us will be 100. We haven’t got the time for this”. 
Temporary and Core Communities 
Again it becomes abundantly clear that these people are stuck in limbo. For years they have been 
living in subpar conditions, receiving unclear information, if any at all, about whether or not they 
can return to their hometown in the foreseeable future. The concept of home by this point is too 
muddled and essentially has become hollow for these people. As dear as they may hold its 
memory, their old home is gone, their current location is both temporary and not even a place 
most of them want to call home, and their future is a big question mark. Unless they relinquish 
their emotional ties to Futaba as they knew it. Move on. But that would mean sacrificing an 
integral part of their identities. At another meeting in 2013 a community leader points out the 
essential issue (RA, 0:21:15): “The government needs to admit that we can’t go home. Because 
it’s stopping us from moving on. They should apologize, buy up whatever land is a write-off, and 
let us move forward with our lives. Life is short, it’s only a few decades. It’s shameful if they 
keep us in limbo for 4-5 years. Once they decide there’s no going back, it’ll be hard to take, but 
we’ll accept it. Everyone will find a new direction. But our hands are tied”. This is something 
that has likely been on everyone’s mind but now is finally being spoken out.  
On the other hand, it is important to note that, having little or no family and having been 
uprooted from their homes, in shelters like these all these people sometimes have is each other. 
As such, new, small, communities manifest. However, these communities are for the most part 
only temporary. One by one people have to move out of the shelter, and only a core community 
remains. As mentioned earlier this core community that remains together ends up in Iwaki. On 
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New Year’s Day 2013-2014, in the Temporary Town in Iwaki a Futaba festival dating back 300 
years was held in the main housing complex. It features a Dharma doll, a symbol for good luck. 
These sort of events are vital to holding what is left of the community together. Preserving long-
standing rituals that are vital to the collective memory and community identity. Despite being in 
a different place, people joyously participate. This is exemplary of how the people carry the 
community with them. They still wish to return to Futaba, but they do the best they can do, and 
in the end one might argue that it is chiefly the shared activity of a group of people that manifests 
their local culture and identity. Now this thesis will take a closer look at several specific cases of 
evacuees that are followed more closely throughout the films, reflecting different strategies of 
coping applied by the people of Futaba that either move on or remain with the core community. 
Nakai Family: In the Face of Absolute Loss 
Many have lost loved ones in 3.11, such as Yuuichi Nakai, a man in his thirties, and his father 
Ichiro Nakai. Yuuichi’s mother was swept away by the tsunami and her body had not been 
recovered at the time of their first interviews. She had been taking a stroll near the ocean just as 
disaster struck. Because of the dangers presented by the nuclear power plant, they have been 
unable to search the area for the remains of missing people. They are unable to give their mother 
and wife a proper burial, and blame the nuclear power plant directly, as Yuuichi states (NN1, 
0:20:45): “If you look at it like that, nuclear power plants are just wrong aren’t they. If there was 
no power plant we could’ve searched right away, and if she was alive she might’ve made it”. As 
Yuuichi and Ichiro go on their first temporary visit to the exclusion zone they carry a camera 
with them, and some of their footage is included in the first film. They go to their old house, or 
where it used to be. Nothing is left in this area but bare foundations of houses. It is an emotional 
return. They brought incense and flowers to pay respect to the mother that passed away. As 
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Ichiro is placing these while Yuuichi is hurrying him. Unfortunately their time is very limited so 
they are forced to be very quick about it, also having to visit friends’ houses. This is all the 
ceremonial grieving they can do right now, a rushed and frustrated effort whilst also processing 
the unimaginable shock of seeing a vast landscape of nothingness where their home, their town, 
and their community used to be. For them it seems that there truly is nothing left to return to. 
Despite how it seems, when they end up moving out of the shelter into temporary housing, they 
deliberately choose in a location in Fukushima, to be closer to Futaba. Ichiro claims to still want 
to return someday, with a surefire expression. This father and son have literally lost everything 
except each other. Nonetheless they are still drawn to return home, even to the point of finding 
comfort of simply moving geographically closer. Their hometown is part of who they are, and 
they cannot imagine relinquishing it.  
Suzuki Family: Salvaging Treasures and Moving On 
Shizuo Suzuki appears to be a man in his late fifties, with his wife bound to a wheelchair. He 
worked as a subcontractor for TEPCO for 27 years, processing radioactive water. Spending 
almost three decades dedicated to the nuclear power plant, it was clearly a significant part of his 
life. They explain how this shelter is the fifth place they have been evacuated to within the span 
of about three months, and now he and his wife leave the shelter for temporary housing where 
they will live alongside his daughter and her family. Shizuo actually appears reluctant to leave 
the shelter, likely because he enjoyed the temporary community they were in. However, being 
with their family seems to comfort them a great deal. Adjusting to the geographical surroundings, 
away from the ocean, might be the hardest thing for them now. After wondering whether fish 
will still taste good this far from the ocean, he says at the dinner table (NN1, 0:26:00): “It feels 
like we’re slowly getting back to normal. Little by little. But it’s hard to get used to this land. We 
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can’t get used to it”, his wife nodding in agreement adds: “Yeah, the difference is like night and 
day”. They have been part of a coastal community for their entire lives, it is something they 
would clearly prefer to hold on to, but given their situation, they seem somehow accepting of 
having to move on. Interestingly, a different coping strategy they employ that also gives us a new 
perspective on memory is ties to objects.  
Shizuo’s daughter Maki return to their old house in Futaba, which is still standing, but 
trashed and has clearly been flooded by the tsunami. They are retrieving a list of items as per 
every family member’s request. They are only allowed to bring one garbage bag per person, two 
persons per household. Special attention is given to Shizuo’s DVD collection and a specific 
jacket for his wife. Though this area was not completely destroyed like that of the Nakai family, 
it was highly damaged nonetheless, and is still within the highly irradiated exclusion zone. On 
the bus ride back Maki and her husband sit in silent contemplation for a while, until she says to 
him (NN1, 0:55:35): “I don’t need to go back there. Do you disagree?”, to which he replies: “We 
have no choice”. Their next stop is a graveyard where their grandparents’ graves are situated. 
Half of the graves have been knocked down and swept away, though theirs are still standing. 
When Shizuo and his wife receive their retrieved items they are highly content. They reminisce 
over memories linked to these items. They watch the recovered DVD’s of their daughters’ 
weddings, a part of their family’s collective memory manifest. Also other articles like the 
clothing get them very emotional, the wife mentioning she cried when she first saw her special 
jacket again. Shizuo says (NN1, 1:01:39): “You don’t realize how attached you are to something 
when you can see it or use it whenever you want. But when you can’t have it… It’s great to have 
it back”. Overall this family seems to have been adjusting well to their new house. Though it is 
still temporary housing, it is a longer term location than their five previous shelters. At the end of 
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the first film Shizuo declares (NN1, 1:23:25): “We’re not going back […] Our lives won’t be any 
different. If anything, things might get worse. We’ve already moves our lives out here. We live 
here now”. Essentially a practical attitude to have, which stands in stark contrast with many 
others. The Suzuki family appear to have accepted to loss of Futaba, and finds comfort in the few 
salvaged pieces of personal property. 
Widow Umeda: Holding On to What Remains 
At the outset of this analysis it was mentioned that when construction of the power plant began 
decades ago the public was in favor, nonetheless there was an opposing minority, of which 
Takako Umeda’s late husband was a part (NN1, 0:54:00): “We opposed it. We were against 
construction, but… He said that if there was an accident, even the pro-nuclear people would 
abandon it. It’s not something you can escape. And he said we’d never be able to go back. He 
predicted that Futaba would be split in two”. He passed away in 2006, before seeing his gloomy 
prophecy actually coming true. As a result of what happened in the present, the memory of this 
man from the perspective of the community as well suddenly transforms, his status elevated. 
Takako mostly reminisces over the time they used to run a textile dyeing shop together. She 
holds on to those memories whenever she cannot sleep and they bring her comfort. In spring 
2013 she goes back to Futaba for her 11th temporary visit. Her house is standing but a complete 
mess on the inside. It seems like every time she comes back she cleans up bit by bit, as much as 
she can with her frail body and the less than two hour time-limit. The camera observes her 
sweeping up dust, and replacing rodent repellent packets. She finds a picture of her late husband 
and ponders leaving it in the house or bringing it with her (NN2, 1:02:44): “I think I’ll leave it 
and have him watch over the house. Sorry darling, forgive me” she says as she place the picture 
in an upright position on the floor. As she leaves the house we see her putting duct tape on the 
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sliding doors from the outside. (NN2, 1:03:25): “I know this is pointless, but…”. And as she 
walks away she utters: “Boy is it ever lonely, not having family, not having kids. I’m all alone”. 
She wants to preserve and protect what she still can here. Despite being aware that it might be 
futile, perhaps never able to actually move back there. But the memory of her husband, much of 
which seems to be tied to this house as well, are essential to her.    She ends up leaving the high 
school shelter and moves into a rental home in Iwaki, apparently joining herself with the core 
community there that seems most strongly set on returning some day. 
Saito Family: Forsaking a Legacy 
The Saito family is one of the oldest in Futaba, going back 600 years. Their ancestors were 
samurai warriors belonging to the Soma clan. The mother of the family explains (NN2, 1:25:00): 
“We’ve had the farm for 16 generations so we were asked to do our best. And we tried. What a 
sad state of affairs. I’m full of regret”. As she is asked about her house in Futaba she responds: 
“I’m sure it’s been taken over by weeds. We had all these pine trees and boxwood bushes too. 
They’re hundreds of years old. Our ancestors planted them, so we took good care of them. I 
worry about all those trees too”. She shows pictures of the house. “[It has been there] from 1927, 
the year I was born. The lumber was cut in the first year of the Showa era, all the materials were 
prepared, and it was built in the second year”. She goes on in detail about the construction and 
layout of the house. The place where she lived for 84 years, until the disaster happened. In this 
family all weddings, funerals, and other ceremonies took place at this house. They even held film 
screenings for the community. The Saito family’s farm has a superbly rich history, central to the 
community and, moreover, this place could not be more essential to the identity of the Saito 
family. It has a place in the collective memory of the entire town, but what now? The house is 
located inside the area that has been designated for the interim waste storage site. The family has 
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received a property evaluation from TEPCO. Before the accident it would have been worth 
$500,000-600,000. Now they will get compensated less than a third than that. The material loss 
is great, but the emotional loss perhaps even greater. Her son adds (NN2, 1:29:35): “It’s the 
central government that ruined our way of life. They need to take the lead on this. This can’t be 
settled with just buying and selling. It’s totally the wrong mentality. And that mentality pisses 
me off”. There is no clear explanation of what it is instead that he is expecting. This too seems to 
be a returning issue. People are stuck in limbo, and a lot of people do not know what exactly they 
want. They want their old Futaba back, their old town and its community, but this is definitely 
impossible. Some move on, but some remain paralyzed by the losses, in this indeterminate state 
of wondering where to go from here. 
Farmer Yoshizawa: Unmoving 
The final case to be discussed is an oddity. Fourteen kilometers from the nuclear plant, within the 
official exclusion zone, lives a livestock farmer who refuses to relocate; Masami Yoshizawa. 
There are signs put up around his farm exclaiming phrases such as “I’ll die for my herd!”. His 
350 or so cows roam freely in the desolated area now, and come back when they please. He 
acknowledges being exposed to radiation, but he could not escape because he could not leave his 
cows behind. The government wants them culled, but he is committed to letting them live. He 
feels his destiny is linked with theirs. For him it seems not so much to be the homeland itself that 
he cannot relinquish, but his stock. For the sake of argument one might say that we can regard 
these living beings as a community that he is the leader of. This is not an issue of memory, but a 
community attachment to these cows that truly have nowhere else to go, as nobody will take in a 
bunch of irradiated cows. In the second film three years later he is still there, looking after his 
herd, ignoring official orders to leave. The cows are showing more and more signs of a range of 
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radiation-induced ailments such as cysts. But as long as they can “eat, sleep and shit” Yoshizawa 
deems them happy and refuses to abandon them. 
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V: Conclusions 
At the outset of this thesis the following questions were posed: What exactly has been disrupted 
through this disaster? How do communities and individuals that have been abruptly uprooted by 
a nuclear disaster cope? How do they reconstruct their collective and individual memories and 
identities? And how do they reframe nuclear energy? To the first question the answer is brief: 
what has been disrupted is the status quo. The normal state of being that, to elderly rural 
residents especially, is something that in general has been quite stable dozens of years. Futaba’s 
firmly rooted community has been displaced and falling apart ever since, and only a core 
community of perhaps a tenth of the original community remains in the Temporary Town, their 
sights set on returning some day. 
 A number of coping strategies have been examined. Through the discussion of the five 
cases of residents’ personal stories it became abundantly clear that there is a large variety. Some 
move on, and some hold on, in different ways. Those that move on might do so reluctantly, such 
as the Saito family that is all but forced to sell their historically important house. A house with a 
significant place in Futaba’s collective memory, that survived 3.11 but nonetheless will 
disappear. Some others that move on do so slightly more readily from a pragmatic approach like 
the Suzuki family. Their attitude is one of not having much choice in the matter. Interestingly, 
they seem to be content with salvaging their dearest personal objects. Their focus is not so much 
on the town’s community as it is on the preservation of their family, and retaining their precious 
personal memories, honoring the past but moving forward. 
Now there is a core community that actively tries to fight to get Futaba back as soon as 
possible in the best shape possible. But there are also those on the sidelines, such as the father 
and son of the Nakai family who have lost both all their possessions as well as the third member 
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of their family, yet still yearn to return. This exemplifies what has been described as community 
attachment in the abstract sense. We actually do not even see them interacting with anybody else, 
but they are still pulled towards Futaba. What they want to return to is something intangible, the 
feeling of the town and its community, the sentiments that the collective memory of the town 
embodies. Then there is the widow Umeda, who describes herself as having nothing left, except 
for the house in the exclusion zone that she lived in with her husband for so many decades. She 
cherishes the house  and maintains and protects it. While the Saito family is going to lose their 
house, she might still be able to return to hers. But the chances of it happening in her lifetime are 
slim and she knows it, yet still she holds on to hope. Lastly, there is the farmer Yoshikawa who 
actually never left. His identity, and therefore by his own choice his destiny, is tied to his cows. 
On the surface this might appear as foolish denial instead of coping, but rather it is complete 
acceptance. He knows the risks but he does not leave. He does not even seem interested in when 
or how Futaba is rebuilt, it will clearly not happen any time soon, but he appears at peace with it, 
he is happy as long as his cows are happy. 
As these cases prove, there are many different ways in which memory is bound to either a 
place, people, or objects. Where the highest importance is placed is an individual issue that 
depends on the person and the context, and how flexible they deem their own identity. Shifting 
the perspective to the collective, however, additional answers surface. Mayor Idogawa’s story is 
arguably the most essential and unique piece of data these documentaries offer, and he represents 
the community in different ways. He was personally responsible for pushing Futaba towards 
even more nuclear reactors, despite the risks. The economic promise was too great and too 
necessary to pass up, just as how they were made to appeal to nuclear host towns throughout 
Japan for decades. He did what he thought was best for the town at the time, and truly all he did 
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was expand on the already established identity of the town as being proud of its relationship with 
nuclear energy. After the disaster the betrayal by the nuclear power he and his town suffered 
shattered his identity, as it did the collective’s. In reconstructing this identity the town’s memory 
of nuclear power was completely overturned. It was not worth it. Now all he wants, and all they 
want is to be rid of it. And yet even in the best case scenario they will be stuck with the radiation 
and its waste for decades to come.  
The mayor is the link between the various levels; between the individual and the 
community, and between the local community and the nation. In addition to taking effective 
action that shapes the future narrative of the town, it is the mayor’s job to put the core 
community’s collective memory into words, and in doing so creates the narrative that spreads 
into the rest of the nation and the world. Aided by media, such as Funahashi’s documentaries, 
these stories feed into the larger collective. A larger collective whose attention towards these 
issues is unfortunately dwindling, which is a process that should be resisted. Japan’s highly 
convoluted history with nuclear energy shows that the capitalist elites somehow always tend to 
get their way by managing the public mainstream discourse. More independent sources such as 
these documentaries are therefore vital to keep a transparent debate surrounding nuclear power 
going, with the whole nation engaged, because nobody wants another 3.11.  
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